VOTING MACHINES
H.R. 811 identifies
Voter Verified Paper Ballots as being associated with two types of voting
machines - Optical scanned paper ballots and paper ballots created by
electronic touch screen systems.
OPTICAL SCANNED PAPER
BALLOTS
Optically scanned ballots have several
problems. Creating, printing, distributing and managing optical ballots is expensive and difficult. Voter race selection errors occur as well as the reliability of
accurately and reliably reading the optical ballot. Election
officials in general have not selected optical ballots as a voting system for
the majority of purchases using HAVA funds Electronic voting machines are
usually the system of choice. While touch screen voting systems tend to have a
higher initial capital purchase, this is easily offset over time by the expense
associated with the cost of printing and administering optical ballots.
TOUCH SCREEN VOTING
SYSTEMS
Touch screen voting
systems are inherently simple to use and lead the voter through the voting
process. The voter makes fewer race selection errors. Voters like the
touch screen systems and have expressed approval satisfaction rates of greater
than ninety percent. The touch screen systems purchased by the States
using HAVA funds have been shown to have problems due to design and
implementation. The existing touch screen systems were developed in the late
1990's and were originally designed to replace a lever voting machine.
Little thought was given in the original design for security, audits and accuracy.
Leaders in the United States Congress recognize these faults and have
introduced the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 to
provide additional direction and funding for to fix the problems with
the current implementation of HAVA
The 2005 Voluntary
Voting System Guidelines
HAVA established the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and
mandated the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) to define the
requirements for accurate and secure elections. These are identified as
the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. Two version were developed, the
2002 Version and the 2005 Version. The
2005 Guidelines are the current active guidelines approved by the EAC. A key
component of the2005 Guidelines, contained in Section 7.9 specified the
requirements for a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). These
requirements use the security concepts of Independent Verification where two
independent records of the vote are generated - a permanent paper record and an
independent electronic record. These records are linked and cross-checked
against each other. The electronic record is used for tallies while the
paper record is used to audit and check the electronic record. This
process is similar to that used with credit card transactions and check
processing. Accounting of transactions is performed by the electronic
record, but the paper receipt and/or paper check is the legal record of the
transaction and can be used to correct the electronic record where required.
Many voting jurisdictions
have recognized the need for a paper records and many required VVPAT to
be provided with systems they planned to purchase using HAVA funds. Voting system manufacturers
responded with a paper printers attached to their touch screen systems . Some vendors claimed they provided VVPAT, but, in fact, none of the
systems implemented VVPAT as specified in the 2005 Voting System Guidelines and
no systems were certified to the 2005 Guidelines. The systems as provided
to the states do not provide the means to insure elections are accurate.
In many cases, our elections may need to be decided in the courts as voting
system vendors have not provided systems which truly meet the VVPAT
requirements.
The Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 -
H.R.811 - The Holt Bill
Current legislation has been proposed to fix the voting machine problem. Some
electronic voting machines do not currently provide a paper record of the
voter’s ballot with the result that election results cannot be audited or
checked. As a result, where close elections exist, the courts are
required to determine the winner. H.R. 811 fixes this problem and
mandates that all voting for the United States General Elections be recorded on
Voter Verified Paper Ballots. Paper ballots must be of an archival
quality to meet national requirements and must also be the legal record of the
vote. Paper ballots must support random audits. All voting systems
must be certified to the 2005 Guidelines including VVPAT. The existing
paper take up printers on electronic voting machines must be replaced with cut
form printers and associated system software that meet these
requirements.
TruVote Voter Verified
Paper Ballot
The TruVote system uses a touch screen system to assists the voter through his
or her race selections and then presents a paper ballot for their his /
her review and acceptance. The paper ballot becomes the legal record of
the vote and as it is approved by the voter. When the voter
accepts the paper ballot, an electronic image of the ballot is also created,
digitally signed and stored in the voting machine. The voter may be able
to deposit or the ballot automatically drops it into a secure ballot box after
the voter verifies the ballot. The electronic ballot record is used for
fast and efficient election tabulations. The paper ballot is available
for audits against the electronic image to insure the election tabulation is
accurate.
Creating a Voter Verified Paper Ballot
The voter verified paper ballot is created in two steps. After the voter has
made their his / her race selections on the voting machine's touch
screen, the voter presses a button on the screen indicating he / she has
accepted the selections and do not want to make additional changes. The
TruVote ballot printer then prints the first portion of the ballot which
contains the race selections. The race selection of a
sample ballot are shown here.
The voter reviews the race
selections on the paper ballot, presses the accept button on the voting machine
and the header for the ballot is printed. The header contains important
additional information. It shows the voter has accepted the ballot and
this is the legal record of his or her vote. A bar code is printed.
This bar code contains the information on the ballot and is used as part of the
audit process. When the bar code is scanned during the manual audit
process, the content of the printed ballot is compared with the electronic
ballot image for accuracy.
The header also contains
information about the election, ballot face, polling place and voting machine
used by the voter. The ballot is cut from the printer and deposited in a
ballot box. When the voter approved ballot is printed, an electronic
image of the ballot is also stored in the voting machine to be used for
electronic tabulations of the vote. A sample voter verified paper ballot
with its header is shown below.
