VOTING MACHINES
H.R. 811 identifies Voter Verified Paper Ballots
as being associated with two types of voting machines - Optical scanned paper
ballots and paper ballots created by electronic touch screen systems.
OPTICAL SCANNED PAPER BALLOTS
Optically scanned ballots have several problems.
Creating, printing, distributing and managing optical ballots is expensive and
difficult. Voter race selection errors occur as well as the reliability of
accurately and reliably reading the optical ballot. Election officials in
general have not selected optical ballots as a voting system for the majority of
purchases using HAVA funds Electronic voting machines are usually the system of
choice.
While touch screen voting systems tend to have a higher initial capital
purchase, this is easily offset over time by the expense associated with the
cost of printing and administering optical ballots.
TOUCH SCREEN VOTING SYSTEMS
Touch screen voting systems are inherently simple
to use and lead the voter through the voting process. The voter makes
fewer race selection errors. Voters like the touch screen systems and have
expressed approval satisfaction rate of greater than
90 percent. The touch screen systems purchased by the States using HAVA
funds have been shown to have problems due to design and implementation. The existing touch screen systems
were developed in the late 1990's and were originally designed to replace a lever
voting machine. Little thought was given in the original design for
security, audits and accuracy. Leaders in the United States Congress
recognize these faults and have introduced the Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2007 to privide additional direction and funding for fix
the problems with the current implementation of HAVA
The 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
HAVA established the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and
mandated the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) to define the
requirements for accurate and secure elections. These are identified as
the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. Two version were developed, the
2002 Version and the 2005 Version. The 2005 Guidelines are the
current active guidelines approved by the EAC. A key component of the2005 Guidelines,
contained in Section 7.9 specified the
requirements for a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). These
requirements use the security concepts of Independent Verification where two
independent records of the vote are generated - a permanent paper record and an
independent electronic record. These records are linked and cross checked
against each other. The electronic record is used for tallies
while the paper record is used to audit and check the electronic record.
This process is similar to that used with credit card transactions and check
processing. Accounting of transactions is performed by the electronic
record, but the paper receipt and/or paper check is the legal record of the
transaction and can be used to correct the electronic record where required.
Voting jurisdictions recognized the need for a paper record and many required VVPAT to be provided with systems they planned to purchase using HAVA funds Voting system manufacturers responded with a paper printer attached to their touch screen systems . Some vendors claimed they provided VVPAT, but in fact none of the systems implemented VVPAT as specified in the 2005 Voting System Guidelines and no systems were certified to the 2005 Guidelines. The systems as provided to the States do not provide the means to insure elections are accurate. In many cases, our elections may need to be decided in the courts as voting system vendors have not provided systems which truly meet the VVPAT requirements.
The Voter Confidence and Increased
Accessibility Act of 2007 - H.R.811 - The Holt Bill
Current legislation has been proposed to fix the voting machine problem. Some
electronic voting machines do not currently provide a paper record of the voters
ballot with the result that election results cannot be audited or checked.
As a result, where close elections exist, the courts are required to determine
the winner. H.R. 811 fixes this problem and mandates that all voting for
the United States General Elections be recorded on Voter Verified Paper Ballots.
Paper ballots must be of an archival quality to meet national requirements and the
legal record of the vote. Paper ballots must support random audits.
All voting systems must be certified to the 2005 Guidelines including VVPAT. The existing paper take up printers on electronic
voting machines must be replaced with cut form printers and associated system
software that meet these requirements.
TruVote Voter Verified Paper Ballot
The TruVote system uses a touch screen system to assists the voter through his
or her race selections and then presents a paper ballot for their review and
acceptance. The paper ballot becomes the legal record of the vote and as
it is approved by the voter. When the voter accepts the paper ballot, an electronic image of the ballot is also created,
digitally signed and stored in the voting machine. The voter deposits the
paper ballot in a secure ballot box. The electronic ballot record is used
for fast efficient election tabulations. The paper ballot is available for
audits against the electronic image to insure the election tabulation is accurate.
Creating a Voter
Verified Paper Ballot
The voter verified paper ballot is created in two steps. After the voter has
made their race selections on the voting machine's touch screen, they press a
button on the screen indicating they have accepted their selections and not want to make additional changes.
The TruVote ballot printer then prints the first portion of the ballot which
contains the race selections. The race selection of a sample ballot are
shown here.
The voter reviews the race selections on the paper ballot, and presses the accept button on the voting machine touch screen and the header for the ballot is printed. The header contains important additional information. It shows the voter has accepted the ballot and this is the legal record of his or her vote. A bar code is printed. This bar code contains the information on the ballot and is used as part of the audit process. When the bar code is scanned during the manual audit process, the content of the printed ballot is compared with the electronic ballot image for accuracy.
The header also contains information about the election, ballot face, polling place and voting machine used by the voter. The ballot is cut from the printer and deposited in a ballot box. When the voter approved ballot is printed, an electronic image of the ballot is also stored in the voting machine to be used for electronic tabulations of the vote. A sample voter verified paper ballot with its header is shown below.
