Voter Verified Paper Ballots
The fundamental requirements for Voter Verified Paper Ballots are defined in the 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines as authorized by the United States Election Assistance Commission as the requirements for a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT).  The intention of the Guidelines was to establish a set of requirements which allowed for accurate recording and audit of elections.  The Guidelines define a system of independent verification as a requirement for accurate recording of votes.  The Voter Verified Paper Ballot as implemented as a VVPAT is a referenced example of independent verification.. 

The Guidelines define an independent verification system as one where:

Independent Verification is the top-level categorization for electronic voting systems that produce multiple records of ballot selections that can be audited to a high level of precision. For this to happen, the records must be produced and made verifiable by the voter, and then subsequently handled according to the following protocol:

At least two records of voter selections are produced and one of the records is then stored such that it cannot be modified by the voting system, e.g., the voting system which creates a record of voter selections and then copies it to some unalterable media

The voter must be able to verify that both records are correct, e.g., verify his or her selections on the voting system’s display and also verify the second record of selections stored on the unalterable storage media

The verification processes for the two records must be independent of each other and (a) at least one of the records must be verified directly by the voter, or (b) it is acceptable for the voter to indirectly verify both records if they are stored on independent systems

The content of the two records can be checked later for consistency through the use of identifiers that allow the records to be linked

An assumption is made that at least one set of records is usable in an efficient counting process such as an automated tabulator, and the other set of records is usable in an efficient process of verifying its agreement with the other set of records used in the counting process. The sets of records would preferentially be different in form and thus have more resistance to accidental or deliberate damage.

Given these conditions, the multiple records are said to be distinct and independently verifiable; that is, both records are not under the control of the same processes. As a result of this independence, one record can be used to audit or check the accuracy of the other record. Because the storage of the records is separate, an attacker who can compromise one of the records still will face a difficult task in compromising the other.

Voting machines offered for purchase by election officials do not meet these requirements.  Election officials, understanding the need for accurate and auditable elections, placed requirements for their systems to be provided with VVPAT as defined in the 2005 Guidelines.  Voting machine vendors had not implemented VVPAT to meet the 2005 Guidelines but claimed VVPAT capability. The result was the purchase of electronic voting machines which did not meet the 2005 Guidelines and need to be upgraded and/or replaced  The Voter Verified Paper Ballot as defined in H.R.811 provides a mandate for all voting machines to meet the requirements of the 2005 Guidelines.  Funding is provided to the States for this upgrade.  The TruVote system meets the 2005 Guidelines requirements and is uniuqe in that it will be be available to the States to be used in the 2008 General Election.

The table below compares some of the requirements for VVPAT in light of H.R. 811 and shows areas of deficiency of existing voting machines and how the TruVote system meets the requirements of H.R.811 and the 2005 Guidelines.